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ABSTRACT
Managing Sales and Product Returns under the Word-of-Mouth E¤ect: Pricing,
Quality, and Restocking Fee Decisions
by
HUI Sun Yuen
Master of Philosophy
This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain involving a manufacturer and a
retailer who make their pricing, quality, and restocking fee decisions under the
word-of-mouth (WOM) e¤ect. To investigate the decision-making problem for the
sales and product returns, we construct a leader-follower game model in which the
manufacturer rst determines his quality e¤ort and the wholesale price and the
retailer then decides on her retail price and the restocking fee. Our results show
that the wholesale and retail prices under no WOM e¤ect are smaller than those
when the WOM e¤ect exists; and, as the WOM has a higher impact on consumer
purchases, the retailer should increase her retail price, and the manufacturer
should also spend more quality control e¤ort and raise his wholesale price. In
addition, when the WOM e¤ect exists, both the restocking fee and the retail
price are decreasing in the mismatch probability. It is interesting to learn that
a positive WOM may not help achieve more total sales and realized sales than a
negative WOM, and the realized sales under the full refund policy may be lower
than those under a partial refund policy. We also nd that the manufacturer
and the retailer may not benet under the WOM e¤ect, which mainly depends
on how consumers are sensitive to the restocking fee and the WOM. The retailer
can benet from the full refund policy when the mismatch chance is not high,
whereas the manufacturer can always benet from the full refund policy.
Key words: word-of-mouth, returns, pricing, restocking fee, game analysis.
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1 Introduction
A couple of decades ago consumers could not access the Internet and had to visit
physical stores for shopping. Since the early 1990s information technology has
been advancing rapidly and allowing consumers to shop online with increasing
convenience and e¢ ciency. In todays electronic market, a consumer can place
an online order with only a few clicks anytime at any place, and can then receive
the goods at a designated address in a short waiting time. According to the
data collected by Loechner (2008), around 85% of consumers in the world have
online shopping experience, which is mainly ascribed to the fact that consumers
usually expect to save their times and easily search for what they desire to pur-
chase. Retailers can also benet from online shopping by managing their retailing
businesses more e¢ ciently with much less cost compared with running a brick-
and-mortar store. That is, eBusiness reconstructs the information ow, money
ow, and supply chain, and also helps improve the benets of both companies
and consumers.
As Fortune magazine (Hao 2013) reported, eBusiness giants in some countries
have gained a signicant share of the Internet economy by developing their online
services ahead of most of other companies. For example, in the United States,
there are Google ($293 billion market capitalization), Amazon ($125 billion),
eBay ($66 billion), and Facebook ($58 billion). In China, Baidu ($33 billion) is
a leading Chinese search engine, Alibaba is viewed as a dominant B2B company,
and Tencent ($69 billion) appears to be the principal player in social networking
and gaming. The number of products sold online is around 5% of total sales
in the United States and the number is 6% in China. As electronic market has
been a battleeld for many companies to reveal their values worldwide, the
competition for the market share becomes more and more intense (Hao 2013),
which is demonstrated by the evidence that a number of companies (e.g., Walmart
and Jet.com) have made a large investment to improve their online businesses.
The booming of eBusiness also induces supply chain partners (i.e., manufacturers
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and retailers) to develop more e¤ective strategies to reduce their costs as well as
increase their market shares and prots.
In order to achieve high sales and increase prots, sellers need to meet the ex-
pectations of customers who are likely to learn other consumersreviews on prod-
ucts or services prior to making a decision. As the Nielsen (2013) a global perfor-
mance management company in the United States reported, 84% of customers
trust their friendsrecommendations and 68% trust online reviews. Such recom-
mendations and online reviews are generally called word of mouth (WOM).
Gwinner et al. (2004) formally dened the online WOM as any positive or neg-
ative statement made by potential, actual, or former customers about a product
or company, which is available to a multitude of people and institutions via the
Internet. The WOM can greatly inuence customers purchase decisions and
help companies e¤ectively enlarge their consumer bases and enjoy higher prots
(American Marketing Association 2016). Marketing sta¤s may adopt the WOM
as a way of promoting their products or services. For example, Amazon is the
rst online company to publicly release consumer reviews with a motivation to
reduce the large expenses mainly caused by product returns. Although some
online consumer reviews might be negative, in todays business world, the ma-
jority of companies have allowed consumers to post their reviews online. As a
leading source of product reviews in the world, Amazon has created wish lists
for consumers to share favorite products in 1999 and launched discussion hubs
in 2006, which helps Amazon obtain valuable opinions as well as a huge success
in marketing. Expedia, a website famous for collecting consumer reviews about
hotels, car-rentings, and others, even developed a policy to encourage experienced
customers (who have made at least one transaction with Expedia online) to leave
their thoughts.
Motived by the successful experiences of online giants such as Amazon and
Expedia, we investigate whether the inuence of the WOM is essential to online
rms that intentionally adopts the WOM as a tool to expand their sales. In
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practice, under the WOM e¤ect, an online rms success is largely dependent on
its pricing, quality, and restocking fee decisions, which play signicant roles in
the management of sales and product returns. In the past years, the increasingly
important value of WOM has induced many researchers to examine the pricing,
quality, or restocking fee decisions. Although no publication has considered the
three decisions jointly, Kwark et al. (2014) and Li et al. (2014) concluded that the
reveal of customer reviews may entice manufacturers and retailers to reduce their
prices and attract customers. To increase sales, manufacturers and retailers may
intend to improve their qualities, which can generate a higher cost for quality
control and may induce those rms to increase their prices. As a result, the
demand may be reduced and those rms may lose their prots. But, the quality
improvement can inuence the WOM and then the demand, viz., a high quality
can result in a positive WOM value, which may be helpful to increase the demand.
Although a low quality usually generates a negative WOM value and then reduces
the demand, it can also save a rms quality control cost. In addition, even when
a rm reduces the quality but increases the price, the rm may still enjoy a higher
prot particularly when the cost is very low and the marginal prot is large enough
to cover the demand loss. Therefore, prior to performing our analysis, we cannot
conclude that a negative WOM value certainly hurts the rms, or a positive WOM
can always benet them. It thus behooves us to examine the pricing and quality
decisions for a manufacturer and the return policy for a retailer in a supply chain.
When a customer is dissatised with a product due to the mismatch between
the actual product and her expectation, the customer is likely to return the
product to the retailer, who has to respond by implementing an e¤ective strategy
to avoid product returns. As in practice, the rm can charge a restocking fee for
any product return, which can be viewed as a cost to be absorbed by customer
returning their mismatched products. The restocking fee has been regarded as
an e¤ective tool in controlling consumersreturns and a¤ecting a rms prot.
As Shulman et al. (2011) observed, a rm tends to set a high restocking fee that
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could be above the retail price to avoid product returns. Similarly, Koessler and
Renault (2012) revealed that a rm is inclined to increase the restocking fee to
discourage customers from returning high-quality products. A high restocking
fee can reduce returns, whereas a low one may maintain loyal consumers. We
also note that some online retailers such as Amazon, Zara, and H&M adopt a
zero restocking fee policy, which raises a research question: could it be optimal
to determine a zero restocking fee? It would be thus interesting and important
to nd an optimal restocking fee for online retailers.
According to our above discussion, we jointly consider the quality, pricing, and
restocking fee decisions for a two-echelon supply chain in a leader-follower setting,
where the manufacturer rst determines his quality level and the wholesale price,
and the retailer then decides on her retail price and the restocking fee. We use
the backward induction to solve the decision problem. In Section 2 we provide
a comprehensive review of extant publications related to the pricing, quality,
and restocking fee decisions under the WOM e¤ect. The review indicates the
originality of our research problem in this paper.
In Section 3, we provide our preliminary discussions regarding the WOM, the
return of mismatched products, and sales function. In section 4, we analyze the
decision problems for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Solving the game,
we obtain two rms decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium. Then, we perform
sensitivity analysis to draw managerial implications concerning the impact of
important parameters on the pricing, quality, and restocking fee decisions as well
as the total sales, the realized sales (i.e., the number of sold products that are
not returned), and two rmsprots.
We have drawn a number of interesting managerial insights. For example,
when the WOM inuences consumerspurchases, the equilibrium restocking fee
is decreasing in consumerssensitivity to the restocking fee, whereas the equilib-
rium retail price is increasing in this sensitivity. Both the manufacturer and the
retailer are worse o¤ when consumers are more sensitive to the restocking fee.
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Under the WOM e¤ect, when consumers are more sensitive to the retail price,
the manufacturer and the retailer are more likely to reduce their wholesale and
retail prices, respectively. In order to mitigate the impact of the consumerssen-
sitivity to the retail price on sales, the retailer should charge a small restocking
fee. Moreover, the manufacturer should spend less e¤ort for quality control in
order to assure his prot margin. We also nd that as consumerspurchases are
more dependent on the average WOM value (i.e., the overall social evaluation of
the product), the retailer should increase her retail price, and the manufacturer
should also spend more e¤ort on his quality control and raise his wholesale price.
In addition, when the WOM e¤ect exists, both the restocking fee and the retail
price are decreasing in the mismatch probability. To improve consumerspur-
chase incentives, the retailer needs to decrease her retail price. This improves the
manufacturers prot, which implies that the manufacturer is better o¤ from the
mismatch.
In Section 5, we conduct extensive discussions of the WOM e¤ect and the
full-refund return policy. Specically, we rst analyze our decision problem with
no WOM e¤ect, and compare our results with those when the WOM e¤ect exists
as in section 4. Such a comparison indicates how the WOM inuences the rms
decisions and prots. We nd that the WOM may not always help the retailer
achieve more total sales and realized sales. Moreover, if each consumer returns
his or her mismatched product with a su¢ ciently large chance, then the realized
sales under the full refund policy are higher than those under a partial refund
policy.
The wholesale and retail prices with no WOM e¤ect are smaller than those
when the WOM e¤ect exists, whereas the restocking fee remains unchanged re-
gardless of whether the WOM e¤ect exists or not. We also nd that the man-
ufacturer and the retailer may not always benet from the WOM e¤ect. For
example, the WOM e¤ect makes the manufacturer worse (better) o¤ if the con-
sumerssensitivity to the restocking fee is su¢ ciently small (large), whereas the
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retailer always benets under the WOM e¤ect. When the consumerssensitivity
to the WOM is su¢ ciently small, the WOM e¤ect makes both rms worse o¤
compared to the case with no WOM e¤ect. In addition, the manufacturer always
prots from the WOM e¤ect, whereas the retailer benets from the WOM e¤ect
only when the mismatch probability is su¢ ciently small. The retailer can be
more benecial under the full refund policy than under a partial refund policy
when the mismatch chance is not high, whereas the manufacturer can always ben-
et from the full refund policy. This paper ends with a summary of managerial
implications in Section 6.
2 Literature Review
We review major publications which are concerned with online sales and product
returns under the WOM e¤ect. Recent empirical studies (e.g., Brynjolfsson, Hu,
and Smith 2006, and Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee 2007) have revealed that the
WOM e¤ect is of great signicance to inuence customerspurchase decisions and
the sales at online retail stores (e.g., Amazon) that sell video games and books
online. If there are a number of long and positive online reviews for a product,
then the sales of the product are very likely to be higher than others even when
the product is a niche one. Judith and Dina (2006) analyzed the user review data
collected from public web sites, and discovered that negative reviews are more
e¤ective in decreasing sales comparing to positive reviews in increasing sales.
The WOM-related academic study is very limited in the past years, although
the WOM plays an important role in online operations, and a number of scholars
have published their ndings related to the impact of pricing, quality, and restock-
ing fee decisions on the sales and product returns. Most of relevant publications
only focus on the impact of one of the three decision variables, and others jointly
consider any two of these three decisions. No paper has jointly considered these
three decisions especially under the WOM e¤ect. Next, we briey summarize our
reviews of major publications that concern the pricing, quality, or restocking fee
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decisions.
The Pricing Decision under the WOM E¤ect Price is the most important
and e¤ective factor in sales and product returns. Kwark et al. (2014) inves-
tigated how the WOM inuences price competitions among manufacturers
as well as retailers. They found that the information of quality di¤erence
indicated by customer reviews increases the competition among manufac-
turers, thus reducing their wholesale prices and the retail prices. If cus-
tomersreviews indicate that manufacturersproducts possess a quality as
those customers expect, then the competition decreases and the wholesale
and retail prices increase. In order to make the WOM valuable to cus-
tomers in their decision-makings, rms need to enlarge its user base and
embrace more customer reviews. In a more recent study, Li (2014) treated
the WOM as a signal of quality, examined the impact of pricing strategies
on the WOM, and found that the sales reects the information accuracy
and a t to customer needs. The author also disclosed that an early-period
price cut can attract more customers and generate more online reviews,
thus improving the accuracy of quality information.
The Restocking Fee Decision under the WOM E¤ect A number of pub-
lications are focused on the role of restocking fee in operations management;
see, e.g., Kroll et al. (1999) and Swinney (2011), who showed that, for a
rm, the restocking fee is an e¤ective method in preventing product returns
and is also a source of the rms prot. They also found that less-informed
consumers are more likely to return their purchased products. As a re-
sponse, the rm may transfer returns-caused costs to consumers by charging
a restocking fee, which can reduce product returns. Therefore, the restock-
ing fee plays both a cost-defrayment role and a role in altering consumer
behavior. This is in agreement with the ndings in some earlier publica-
tions by, e.g., Davis et al. (1998) and Peterson and Kumar (2010) who
had mainly discussed return policies that a higher production cost causes a
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more restrict return policy. Shulman et al. (2009) also demonstrated that a
retailer may raise the hassle cost to discourage excessive returns; and when
consumers strongly expect to obtain the right product, a higher restock-
ing fee can e¤ectively prevent them from exchanging and thus improve the
retailers prot.
The Quality Decision under the WOM E¤ect Quality is a major issue for
consumers to generate the WOM values regarding their use experiences.
Firms may intentionally improve product quality to reduce product returns
(Kuzma and Shanklin 1992, Powell 1995, and Hendricks and Singhal 1996).
AsWright and Heiens (1999) and Espejel-Blanco and Fandos-Herrera (2008)
revealed, the chance for product returns is low if consumers are condent
with the product quality, which implies that consumers possess loyalties
toward high quality products. As a response, in practice many rms have
invested enormously to improve the quality of their products even with a
target of a very high level. However, as recent studies (Manchanda and
Chintagunta 2006 and Manduchi 2010) explored, the WOM has an indirect
impact on the quality decision and thus, a number of rms have overstated
the value of their products, which do not match customer needs. In fact,
when a product matches customer needs, the WOM is useful to delivering
values, e¤ectively improving the sales, and reducing product returns.
Joint Pricing and Quality Decisions under the WOM E¤ect In the last
decade, very few publications were concerned with the pricing and qual-
ity decisions under the WOM e¤ect. As a seminal paper, Mathios (2000)
performed an empirical study for the salad industry, using the data from up-
scale supermarkets in the state of New York i.e., duopoly markets where
salad dressings are either high or low in fat. The results revealed that
rms are willing to disclose product information when the quality of their
products is able to meet customersexpectations on, e.g., the low-fat salad
dressings. Koessler and Renault (2012) found that quality changes with
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the price swing. Full disclosure of the product information helps achieve
the price equilibrium in a market and maximize the prots of rms in the
market. Under such a price equilibrium top quality rms intentionally uti-
lize the WOM and sell their products at high prices; see, e.g., Koessler
and Renault (2012). In addition, Board (2009) showed that a low-quality
rm may set a high price and then enjoy free ride from high-quality rms,
which would decide to share the product information even though a higher
competition leads the price to fall.
Joint Pricing and Restocking Fee Decisions under the WOM E¤ect In
practice, consumers usually prefer to learn about product features prior to
their purchases, which is more likely to occur when the refund is smaller.
Recent studies (e.g., Hess et al. 1996) have shown that when the value of
a product is higher, the opportunistic returns of the product rise. As a
response, rms increase their prices and also nonrefundable charges (i.e.,
restocking fees), as such charges make rms more protable. Ofek et al.
(2011) have found that a consumer has a higher risk of buying a defective
product at an online store than at an brick-and-mortar store. To solve this
problem, online retailers may invest to reduce the rate of defects; as a re-
sult, a product that is available for online sale could have a higher price
than that sold at a physical store. Otherwise, the pricing and restocking
fee decisions play important roles in reducing product returns. A rm may
set a restocking fee above its cost to prevent consumers from buying from
its competitors, as reported by Shulman et al. (2011).
After we review relevant publications and reports, we found that there is no
publication specically regarding joint quality and restocking fee decisions under
the word-of-mouth e¤ect. And we can conclude that our paper signicant di¤ers
from any extant publication. As briey described in Section 1, in this paper
we jointly analyze the impact of pricing, quality, and restocking fee decisions
under the WOM e¤ect. We construct a leader-follower game model in which
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a manufacturer rst determines his wholesale price and the quality level and a
retailer then determines her retail price and the restocking fee. We solve the game
to attain the two rmspricing and quality decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium.
Our decision-making models have not been considered in the literature. That
is, a major contribution of our analysis is to explore the complex impact of the
major three decisions for online operations (i.e., price, quality, and restocking
fee) under the WOM e¤ect. Such an investigation is important because consumer
reviews has signicantly inuenced the management of online sales and product
returns in todays electronic markets, as the rapid development of information
technology enables customers to acquire more information about products easily
and quickly. Our results are expected to expose the WOM e¤ect on the pricing,
quality, and restocking fee decisions in online operations.
3 Preliminaries
We consider a supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer who serve
consumers in a market. The manufacturer produces a specic product and sells
it to the retailer, who then satises consumer demand. As each consumer may
return his or her mismatched product to the retailer, we consider the sales and
product return decision-making stages in the supply chain. Next, we discuss some
issues in the two stages.
3.1 Quality and Word-of-Mouth
In reality, the WOM usually plays a vital role in each consumers purchasing
decision-making process. Specically, prior to a consumers purchase, she can-
not exactly ensure the products quality, attributes, and performance, and thus
usually has to search these information by reading previous consumers(online)
product reviews and/or consulting her friends (a.k.a. WOM). The WOM can be
viewed as a reference value for the consumer on which she can decide whether or
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not to buy. Since previous consumers often follow their experiences to assess the
product with, for example, a grade between 0 (worst) and 5 (best), we can esti-
mate the average WOM value for the product according to previous consumers
grades. Note that the WOM can a¤ect the consumers purchase intention psy-
chologically; and as usual, the higher the average WOM value is, the more the
consumer is willing to buy. According to the average WOM value, the consumer
can have a general image about the product. Naturally, a greater quality level of
the product can induce consumers to make a higher grade. That is, the average
WOM value is increasing in the product performance mainly in terms of quality
level, as discussed by Wright and Heiens (1999), Manchanda and Chintagunta
(2010), Espejel-Blanco and Fandos-Herrera (2008), Manduchi (2010), and others.
The manufacturer can spend more e¤ort on the quality improvement and raise
the average WOM value, which then increases the demand. But, this entails the
manufacturer incurring a higher cost. Therefore, it is important for the manufac-
turer to make a proper decision on his e¤ort on quality improvement. Hereafter,
the e¤ort is simply represented by the manufacturers quality level q. In this
paper, we denote the average WOM value by r(q). As discussed above, r(q) is an
increasing, concave function of q, i.e., r0(q)  0 and r00(q)  0.
As in practice, the average WOM value r(q)may be positive, zero, or negative.
Specically, a positive WOM value (i.e., r(q) > 0) means that past consumers, in
general, accept the product quality. A zero WOM value (i.e., r(q) = 0) implies
that overall, consumers evaluate the product neutrally, which may not signi-
cantly inuence new consumerspurchasing decisions. A negative WOM value
(i.e., r(q) < 0) represents previous consumers negative views on the product
quality; this discourages new consumers to buy from the retailer. As a higher
quality level results in a greater WOM value, there should exist a reference point
q0 > 0 on the quality level such that r(q) > 0 if q > q0, r(q0) = 0, and r(q) < 0 if
q < q0. In this paper, we specify the average WOM value function in a logarith-
mic form, i.e., r(q) = k ln(q=q0), where k > 0 means the increase in the average
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WOM value resulting from an one percent increase in the quality cost, measuring
the impact of the manufacturers quality e¤ort on the WOM.
3.2 Restocking Fee, Realized Sales and Returns
A consumer may purchase a product that mismatches her expectation on the
product performance. When a consumer observes a mismatch, she may decide to
return this product to the retailer. As a result, we should consider the realized
sales(i.e., the number of the sold products that are not returned, denoted byD1)
and unrealized sales(i.e., the number of the sold products that are returned,
denoted by D2).
The retailer pays the wholesale price w to procure the product from the manu-
facturer, and sells it to the consumer at the retail price p. Therefore, the retailers
prot generated from the realized sales is (p w)D1. If a product does not match
a consumers preference and is thus returned to the retailer, then the retailer
should refund the consumers purchase payment. As in many real operations, the
retailer may or may not charge a restocking fee on each consumers return, and
she can also obtain a salvage value s from dealing with each unit return. Suppose
that s < c (c is the manufacturers unit production cost), which means that the
consumer return is socially ine¢ cient and thus generates a negative social welfare.
In this paper, we consider a xed restocking fee $f per unit, which is consistent
with a number of rmsoperational decisions in practice; see examples in Table 1.
As a result, the retailers prot from the unrealized sales is (f + s w)D2. Note
that, if the retailer guarantees a full refund policy for consumers, then the retailer
can obtain a prot from such returns as (s   w)D2, where f = 0. Accordingly,
the retailers total expected prot is given as (p  w)D1 + (f + s  w)D2.
Next, we discuss the realized and unrealized sales D1 and D2. In this paper,
the mismatch occurs with likelihood  2 (0; 1) and thus, the product satises
the consumers need with probability 1    . Moreover, as the restocking fee
is increased, each consumer has less intention to return his or her mismatched
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Firm Restocking Fee ($/unit)
Premier Lacewigs
(http://www.premierlacewigs.com/exchange-return-policy)
$25/unit
US Air Puriers LLC.
(http://www.usairpurifiers.com/returns-exchanges.html)
$25/ unit
Evannex
(http://evannex.com/pages/returns)
$75/unit
Road Armor
(http://www.roadarmor.com/warranty-and-terms-of-service)
$350/unit
Sea Catch
(http://www.seacatch.com/prices.htm)
$25/unit
Oar Board
(http://www.oarboard.com/policies/)
$40/unit
Table 1: Practical examples of the restocking fee under partial refund policies.
product. Accordingly, we assume that a mismatched product is returned with a
probability (f) 2 [0; 1] that is a decreasing, convex function of f . We specify
(f) in exponential function form: (f) = exp( f), where  > 0 represents
the instantaneous reduction rate of the return probability with per incremental
restocking fee, measuring the impact of restocking fee on the consumer returns.
Hence, a sold product will be returned with probability (f).
On the other hand, the consumers purchase decision actually depends on the
retail price p as well as the average WOM value r(q). Accordingly, we construct
a p- and r(q)-dependent total demand function as follows:
D(r(q); p) = a exp( b1p+ b2r(q)), (1)
where a > 0 denotes the market size; b1, b2 > 0 represent the instantaneous
reduction rate of the total sales with an increment in retail price p and a decre-
ment in the average WOM value r(q), respectively. Hereafter, we simply call
b1 and b2 the pricing e¤ect on total sales and WOM e¤ect on total sales,
respectively. As indicated by a recent comprehensive review (Huang, Leng, Par-
lar 2013), the exponential model structure in (1) has been used in a number
of relevant publications (e.g., Jeuland and Shugan 1988, Hanssens and Parsons
1993, Song et al. 2008, and Xu 2009). We also learn from KelloggInsight
(2012) and Chargebacks911.com (2015) that the impact of the restocking fee
on product returns is very likely to be smaller than the impact of the retail
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price on total sales. This implies that  < b1, which means that consumers
are more sensitive to the retail price in their purchases than to the restocking
fee in their product returns. According to these discussions, we can write the
realized sales and the returns as D1(r(q); p; f) = (1   (f))  D(r(q); p) and
D2(r(q); p; f) = (f)  D(r(q); p), respectively. Therefore, the total sales is
D1(r(q); p; f) +D2(r(q); p; f) = D(r(q); p; f).
4 Model Analysis and Managerial Implications
We consider a leader-follower game in which the manufacturer rst determines
his quality level and wholesale price, and the retailer then decides on her retail
price and restocking fee. Solving the game we can nd the two rmsdecisions in
Stackelberg equilibrium. Next, we start with the best response analysis for the
retailer.
4.1 Retailers Pricing and Restocking Fee Decisions
As discussed in Section 3.2, the retailers expected prot including those generated
from both the realized sales D1(p; r(q)) and the returns D2(p; r(q)) is written as
R(p; f) = (p  w)(1  (f))D(p; r(q)) + (f + s  w)(f)D(p; r(q))
= [(p  w)(1  (f)) + (f + s  w)(f)]D(p; r(q)):
Given the manufacturers wholesale price w and quality level q, we can nd the
retailers best response on the retail price and the restocking fee.
Proposition 1 The retailers optimal retail price p and restocking fee f  are
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determined as
p = w +
1
b1
+
1

W ( z exp ( z)) and f  = z   s+ 1

W ( z exp ( z)) ,
(2)
where z  1=b1 + 1= and W () is the Lambert W (omega) function. 
We learn from the above proposition that the optimal restocking fee is de-
creasing in the salvage value, which means that the retailer prefers to charge a
lower restocking fee if returns have higher salvage values. The reason is that a
major aim of charging the restocking fee is to compensate the cost resulting from
managing, restoring, repacking, and reshipping the returned products. Moreover,
we also nd that the restocking fee f  is independent of w, because the restocking
fee mainly functions to control returns.
The termW ( z exp ( z)) in (2) must be a negative real number, because,
for any values of parameters , b1, and  2 (0; 1), we nd that z = 1 + =b1 > 1
and z exp ( z)  exp( 1). Thus,   exp( 1)   z exp ( z) < 0, and
W ( z exp ( z)) is negative real number in the range [ 1; 0].
4.2 Manufacturers Wholesale Pricing and Quality Deci-
sions
Using the retailers best response on the retail price and restocking fee, the man-
ufacturer determines his wholesale price and quality level. In the supply chain,
the manufacturer incurs the production cost c as well as the quality control cost
qc, and enjoys the unit revenue w. Thus, the manufacturers prot is given as
M(w; qc) = (w   c  qc)D(p; r(q)). (3)
Proposition 2 In Stackelberg equilibrium, the manufacturers quality level q
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and wholesale price w are derived as
q =
b2
b1
and w = c+
1 + b2
b1
.  (4)
The above proposition indicates that the manufacturers wholesale pricing
and quality decisions are associated with the relative signicance between the
impact of retail price on sales (i.e., b1) and the impact of WOM on sales (i.e., b2).
That is, if consumers are more sensitive to the WOM compared with the retail
price in their purchases, viz., the value of b2=b1 increases, then the manufacturer
should raise his quality control e¤ort, which increases the manufacturers unit
quality cost. In order to assure his prot, the manufacturer also needs to increase
the wholesale price. The retailer then responds by increasing her retail price, as
indicated by the the retail price in Stackelberg equilibrium given below.
Substituting the manufacturers equilibrium decisions into p and f  in (2), we
can obtain the retailers retail price and restocking fee in Stackelberg equilibrium
as
p = c+
2 + b2
b1
+
1

W ( z exp ( z)) and f  = z s+ 1

W ( z exp ( z)) .
(5)
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We investigate the impacts of major parameters (including , b1, b2 and ) on
rmspricing, quality, and restocking decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium, and
also on the sales and two rmsprots. To do so, we perform sensitivity analysis
for each parameter and draw managerial implications.
4.3.1 The Impact of 
Parameter  measures the impact of the retailers restocking fee on the consumers
return decision. We next examine the e¤ect of  on the retailers decisions, the
expected sales, and two rmsprots.
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Corollary 1 As the impact of the restocking fee on returns increases, the re-
stocking fee f  decreases (i.e., @f =@ < 0) whereas the retail price p increases
(@p=@ > 0). 
The results in Corollary 1 are justied as follows. If consumers are more sen-
sitive to the restocking fee, then the retailer has to reduce the restocking fee,
which induces more consumers to return their mismatched products. In order
to compensate the loss from the increasing returns, the retailer needs to raise
her retail price. The expected sales in Stackelberg equilibrium are D(p; r(q)) =
a exp( b1p+b2r(q)). Therefore, @D(p; r(q))=@ =  b1D(p; r(q))@p=@ <
0. This suggests that a decrease in the value of  can help increase the expected
sales.
We next discuss the impact of  on two rmsprots. The manufacturers
prot under the Stackelberg equilibrium is M(w; q) = D(p; r(q))=b1. We
thus have @M(w; q)=@ = (@D(p; r(q))=@)=b1 < 0, which indicates that an
increase in consumerssensitivity to the restocking fee can reduce the manufac-
turers expected prot. Moreover, di¤erentiating R(p; f ) once w.r.t.  gives
@R(p
; f )
@
=
1
b1

(f )D(p; r(q))
@f 
@
  b1(1  (f ))D(p; r(q))@p

@

,
which is also negative because @f =@ < 0 and @p=@ > 0. This implies that
an increase in the value of  makes the retailer worse o¤.
4.3.2 The Impact of b1
We perform sensitivity analysis to investigate the impact of parameter b1 on two
rmsdecisions in Stackelberg equilibrium, the expected sales, and two rms
prots.
Corollary 2 Under a partial refund policy, the impacts of b1 on two rmsde-
cisions are characterized as follows: the retailers restocking fee and retail price
are both decreasing in b1 (i.e., @f =@b1 < 0 and @p=@b1 < 0, and the manufac-
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turers wholesale price and the quality level are also both decreasing in b1 (i.e.,
@w=@b1 < 0 and @q=@b1 < 0). 
As the above corollary indicates, if consumers have a greater concern about
the retail price when they make their purchase decisions, then the retailer should
charge a smaller restocking fee. This happens mainly because a reduction in the
restocking fee can help mitigate the impact of consumersgreater price sensitivity
on sales. Moreover, a higher consumer sensitivity on the retail price in sales
induces the retailer to reduce her retail price, simply because the retailer intends
to prevent the total sales from dropping due to the higher consumer sensitivity.
Corollary 2 also indicates that the manufacturer responds to a higher consumer
sensitivity to the retail price by decreasing his wholesale price and unit quality
cost. This is mainly attributed to the fact that a reduction in the wholesale price
follows a decrease in the retail price, and also induces the manufacturer to spend
less e¤ort on his quality control.
4.3.3 The Impact of b2
We now examine the impact of b2 the parameter measuring a consumers sensi-
tivity to theWOM in his or her purchase on the manufacturers and the retailers
decisions in Stackelberg equilibrium. The restocking fee f  is independent of b2,
as the WOM inuences sales rather than product returns which are solely related
to the restocking fee. From (5), we can observe that the retail price rises as the
consumer sensitivity to the WOM increases. This means that as consumers pay
more attention to the average WOM value (i.e., the overall social evaluation of
the product), the retailer would respond by increasing her retail price. In addi-
tion, we learn from (4) that the manufacturers quality and wholesale price are
both increasing in the consumer sensitivity to the WOM. This implies that the
consumers higher concern about the WOM leads the manufacturer to improve
his quality (by increasing the unit quality cost), which in return increases the
average WOM value. However, a greater quality level reduces the manufacturers
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prot margin; as a response to this reduction, she decides to raise the wholesale
price.
The rst-order derivative of the total sales D(p; r(q)) w.r.t. b2 is given as
@D(p; r(q))
@b2
= D(p; r(q))

 b1@p

@b2
+ r(q) + b2r0(q)
@q
@b2

= D(p; r(q))r(q),
which means that the impact of the consumer sensitivity to the WOM on the total
sales depends on whether there is a positive or negative overall WOM valuation.
If the averageWOM value is negative, then an increase in the consumer sensitivity
to the WOM decreases the sales; otherwise, if consumers positively evaluate the
product, then a higher consumer sensitivity to the WOM can encourage more
consumers to buy. Noting that the realized sales are (1  (f ))D(p; r(q)), we
can conclude that the consumer sensitivity to the WOM inuences the realized
sales in a same mode as the WOM a¤ects the total sales. Moreover, the impact of
b2 on the manufacturers and the retailers prots similarly depends on the 1
average WOM value r(q).
4.3.4 The Impact of 
The parameter  characterizes the mismatch chance, which does not inuence
the manufacturers wholesale pricing and quality decisions in Stackelberg equilib-
rium, because such decisions solely a¤ect the consumer purchase and the WOM
value, thus inuencing the sales. We observe from (2) and (5) that both the re-
stocking fee f  and the retail price p are decreasing in  , which results from the
following fact: for a higher mismatch chance, a larger number of consumers ex-
perience the mismatch between their expectations and the product performance.
To improve consumerspurchase motivations, the retailer needs to decrease her
retail price (as the average WOM value is unchanged), which then raises the to-
tal sales D(p; r(q)). Therefore, the manufacturers prot is also increasing in
the mismatch chance, which implies that the manufacturer is better o¤ from the
mismatch. This occurs mainly because the manufacturer is not involved into the
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management of product returns, as discussed by KelloggInsight (2012).
The retailer reduces her restocking fee to allow more consumers to return
their mismatched products; this may not decrease the realized sales (i.e., (1  
(f ))D(p; r(q))). The rst-order derivative of the realized sales w.r.t.  is
  D(p
; r(q))
[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]

(f ) +
b1

(1  (f ))W ( z exp ( z))

,
where the rst and second terms in the curly brackets { } are positive and
negative, respectively. Moreover, the rst term is independent of  and the second
term is decreasing in  . Accordingly, there exists a threshold ^ such that if   ^ ,
then the realized sales increase when the mismatch chance is higher; otherwise, the
realized sales is decreasing in the mismatch chance. That is, when a su¢ ciently
small number of consumers experience the mismatch, an increase in the mismatch
probability does not signicantly increase the number of returned products but
it reduces the retail price and raises the sales. As a consequence, the realized
sales increase when   ^ . When the mismatch happens with a larger chance,
there are a greater number of returned products and thus, the realized sales are
smaller. The retailers prot exhibits a similar changing pattern as the realized
sales.
5 E¤ects of WOM and Restocking Fee
In the preceding section, we have analyzed the pricing, quality, and restocking
fee decisions made by two rms to manage sales and product returns under the
WOM e¤ect. To further examine the impact of the WOM and the refund amount,
we study the supply chain with no WOM e¤ect or with full refund for all product
returns, and compare our results with those in Section 4 to draw managerial
implications regarding the e¤ects of the WOM and refund policy on the supply
chain.
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5.1 Implications for the WOM E¤ect
We analyze the supply chain under no WOM e¤ect. In the absence of a WOM
e¤ect, the sales function in (1) is reduced to D(p) = a exp( b1p), which is only
dependent on the retail price p. In such a setting, the manufacturer does not make
the quality decision but only decides on the wholesale price. The manufacturers
and the retailers prots are given as
8><>: M(w) = (w   c)D(p),R(p; f) = [(p  w)(1  (f)) + (f + s  w)(f)]D(p),
where the symbol  refers to the case without a WOM e¤ect in the market.
5.1.1 The Equilibrium Decisions under No WOM E¤ect
We compute the manufacturers and the retailers decisions in Stackelberg equi-
librium.
Proposition 3 When there is no WOM e¤ect in the market, the retailers equi-
librium restocking fee, the equilibrium wholesale and retail prices are determined
as
w = c+
1
b1
, f  = z s+ 1

W ( z exp ( z)) , and p = c+ 2
b1
+
W ( z exp ( z))

. 
(6)
The above indicates that both the wholesale price w and the retail price p
are decreasing in the consumers sensitivity to the retail price in their purchases,
which is similar to the impact of b1 on the retail price p as shown in Section
4.3.2. Moreover, we also observe that the parameter  a¤ects the restocking fee
f  and the retail price p in a way similar to its e¤ect on f  and p. We compare
the pricing and restocking fee decisions ( w; p; f ) with those when the WOM
takes e¤ect, and draw relevant results below.
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Theorem 1 The equilibrium wholesale and retail prices under no WOM e¤ect
are smaller than those when the WOM e¤ect exists. But, the equilibrium re-
stocking fee is independent of whether there is a WOM e¤ect or not. 
The above theorem shows that, in a market with a WOM e¤ect on consumer
purchase decisions, both the manufacturer and the retailer have incentives to raise
their wholesale and retail prices, respectively. When consumers do not consider
the WOM in their purchase decisions, we nd that the total sales and the realized
sales are D(p) and (1   ( f ))D(p), respectively. Comparing them to those
under the WOM e¤ect i.e., D(p; r(q)) and (1  (f ))D(p; r(q)) yields the
following important results.
Theorem 2 The retailer may not achieve higher total sales and realized sales
under the WOM e¤ect, which depends on the ratio of the equilibrium quality
control level q to the initial quality level q0. Specically, if
q
q0
 exp(1), (7)
then the WOM e¤ect reduces the total sales and realized sales; otherwise, both
of these two sales rise. 
The above theorem indicates that if the equilibrium quality q is smaller than
the initial quality level q0, then the WOM would have a negative e¤ect on con-
sumerspurchase decisions, which reduces consumersincentives to buy. Other-
wise, there is a positive WOM e¤ect. But, it may not be helpful to increase the
expected sales. That is, when the equilibrium quality level q is su¢ ciently high
such that the ratio q=q0 is larger than the cuto¤ level exp(1), the positive WOM
e¤ect can result in more expected sales. However, if the manufacturer chooses
a quality level such that q0 < q  exp(1)q0, then although the WOM has a
positive e¤ect on consumer purchases, the sales are still smaller under the WOM
e¤ect. This reects the fact that prior to buying a product, each consumer needs
to have an expectation on the product quality that is signicantly higher than
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his or her reference point level q0. Accordingly, in order to increase the sales, the
manufacturer needs to exert an e¤ort to guarantee a su¢ ciently high WOM so
that such a WOM can encourage more consumers to purchase. According to (4)
(i.e., q = b2=b1), we can rewrite the condition (7) as
b2  exp(1)q0b1, (8)
which means that if consumerssensitivity to the retail price (i.e., b1) and/or the
threshold for the quality cost (i.e., q0) are signicantly low, then the WOM e¤ect
is very likely to enlarge the sales.
5.1.2 The Impacts of Major Parameters under No WOM E¤ect
We next investigate the impacts of major parameters , b1, b2 and  on the
manufacturers and the retailers expected prots. In what follows, we conduct
several numerical analyses to examine these e¤ects. Figure 1 illustrates the impact
of consumerssensitivity to the restocking fee (i.e., ) on two rmsprots. We
increase the value of  from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045. We observe that as 
is very low, the manufacturer will become worse o¤ if he exerts the e¤ort on the
quality improvement to raise the WOM e¤ect; but, when  is su¢ ciently large,
he is better o¤ from his e¤ort. However, the retailer can always benet from
the WOM e¤ect. This is justied as follows: we learn from Theorem 1 that,
regardless of how consumers are sensitive to the restocking fee in their returns,
the retail price in Stackelberg equilibrium under the WOM e¤ect is always higher
than that when there is no WOM e¤ect and thus, the retailers pricing decision
discourages consumers to buy and reduces the sales compared with the scenario
with no WOM e¤ect. For the case of a smaller value of , more consumers return
their mismatched products, and the retailer can still benet mainly because she
enjoys a high marginal prot. But, this enforces the manufacturer to spend more
e¤ort on quality control. As a result, although the manufacturer also responds to
the WOM e¤ect by raising his wholesale price, he still experiences a lose resulting
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from the WOM e¤ect because he needs to a¤ord the cost for quality improvement.
However, when consumers become more sensitive to the restocking fee in their
returns, consumers returns are signicantly reduced, and the retailer is thus
willing to set a lower price than that when consumers are less sensitive, which
yields more sales. As a consequence, both the manufacturer and the retailer
benet from the WOM e¤ect.
Figure 1: The impact of  on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions when the WOM e¤ect exists and those when there is no WOM e¤ect.
Figure 2 indicates the impact of consumers sensitivity to the retail price
(i.e., b1) on two rmsprots when the rms make their decisions in Stackelberg
equilibrium. We increase the value of  from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045. We nd
that if this sensitivity is very low, then both the manufacturer and the retailer
can benet from the WOM e¤ect; otherwise, the WOM makes both rms worse
o¤. This is ascribed to the fact that, as consumers are less sensitive to the retail
price, in order to expand the market sales, the manufacturer may exert a larger
e¤ort on quality control (which results in a higher WOM value), and both rms
thus obtain higher prots. However, when consumers are more sensitive to the
retail price, the manufacturer invests less on quality control, which reduces the
sales. Actually, we can learn from our numerical experiments that under the
WOM e¤ect, both the total sales and the realized sales are decreasing in the
value of b1. As a result, both rms become worse o¤ from the WOM e¤ect.
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Figure 2: The impact of b1 on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions when the WOM e¤ect exists and those when there is no WOM e¤ect.
We depict Figure 3 to investigate the e¤ect of consumerssensitivity to the
WOM (i.e., b2) on two rmsprots. We increase the value of  from 0.05 to
0.5 in steps of 0.045. If the value of this sensitivity is low, then both rms are
more benecial in the absence of WOM in the market; otherwise, the WOM can
help improve both rmsprots. This occurs because when consumers are less
sensitive to the WOM, the sales are lower than those without a WOM e¤ect, even
if the WOM has a positive e¤ect on consumerspurchase decisions. But, when
the WOM value is su¢ ciently high, the sales are larger than those in the absence
of a WOM, which thus makes both rms better o¤. We also nd that both the
manufacturer and the retailer are more benecial when consumerssensitivity to
the WOM is higher.
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the mismatch probability  on two rms
prots. We increase the value of  from 0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045. We nd that
the WOM hurts the retailer when  is very high, because, otherwise, the expected
returns are low and thus, the retailer can benet from the WOM by achieving
more sales. But, when the value of  is very large, each consumer has a high
chance to experience a mismatch and the expected returns are thus high, which
makes the retailer worse o¤. We nd that the manufacturer can always benet
from the WOM for any value of  , because in the supply chain, the retailer is
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Figure 3: The impact of b2 on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions when the WOM e¤ect exists and those when there is no WOM e¤ect.
solely responsible for all the cost associated with product returns; moreover, an
increase in the mismatch chance induces the retailer to reduce her retail price,
which encourages more consumers to buy. Therefore, the manufacturer can prot
from the WOM e¤ect. We also observe an interesting (and surprising) result as
follows: the manufacturers prot is increasing in the value of  . This is mainly
attributed to the following reason: an increase in the mismatch probability leads
the retailer to reduce her retail price, thus attracting more consumers to buy. This
makes the manufacturer better o¤. However, the retailers prot is increasing in
the value of  only when  is su¢ ciently small, because as the mismatch likelihood
is small, in order to attract consumers to buy, she has to charge a low retail
price and the sales are thus high, which makes the retailer better o¤. But, the
retailers prot is decreasing in the value of  when the mismatch probability
is su¢ ciently large, because product returns signicantly increase and thus the
retailer experiences a prot loss.
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Figure 4: The impact of  on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions when the WOM e¤ect exists and those when there is no WOM e¤ect.
5.2 Implications for the Restocking Fee in the Returns of
Mismatched Products
We consider a scenario in which the retailer provides a full refund to each con-
sumer who returns his or her mismatched product, i.e., f = 0. In this scenario,
the mismatch chance is still  . The manufacturers and the retailers prots are
written as
^M(w) = (w   c  q)D(p; r(q)),
^R(p) = (p  w)(1  )D(p; r(q)) + (s  w)D(p; r(q))
= [(p  w)(1  ) + (s  w) ]D(p; r(q)).
5.2.1 The Equilibrium Decisions under the Full Refund Policy for
Product Returns
We solve the leader-follower game in which the manufacturer rst makes his
wholesale price and quality decisions, and the retailer then decides on her retail
price and restocking fee.
Proposition 4 Under the full refund policy, the manufacturers and the retailers
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equilibrium decisions can be determined as
w^ = c+
(1  )(1 + b2)
b1
, q^ =
(1  )b2
b1
, and p^ =
c  s
1   +
2 + b2
b1
. 
According to the above proposition and our analytical results in Section 4.2,
we nd that w > w^ and q > q^. However, the retail price p^ may be higher or
may be lower than p, which depends on the di¤erence between the cost c and
the salvage value s. Specically, if this di¤erence is su¢ ciently large such that
c  s > (1  )W ( z exp ( z)) =(), then p^ > p; otherwise, p^  p. This
means that only when the salvage value is so large that the di¤erence between c
and s is signicantly low, the retailer would charge a retail price lower than that
under a partial refund policy; for other cases, the retailer would set a higher retail
price under the full refund policy. This result is justied as follows: under the full
refund policy, customers are more likely to return their mismatched products and
thus, in order to reduce the loss generated by the increasing returns, the retailer
would set a higher retail price when the the salvage value is signicantly small.
To compensate the retailer, the manufacturer would also charge a low wholesale
price under the full refund policy. In order to obtain an acceptable prot margin,
the manufacturer also decides to reduce her investment on quality control.
We next compare the Stackelberg euqilibrium-dependent sales between the
full and the partial refund policies.
Theorem 3 If the probability of returning a mismatched product is su¢ ciently
large such that
(f )  1


1  (1  ) exp

b1(s  c)
1    
b22
b1
+
b1

W ( z exp ( z))

,
(9)
then the realized sales under the full refund policy (i.e., f = 0) are higher than
those under a partial refund policy; otherwise, the realized sales are lower under
the full refund policy. 
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The above theorem indicates that implementing the full refund policy may or
may not generate more realized sales. That is, when the probability of returning
a mismatched product is signicantly small, the restocking fee can e¤ectively
prevent consumers from returning; thus, the realized sales under a partial refund
policy are higher than those under the full refund policy.
5.2.2 The Impacts of Major Parameters under the Full Refund Policy
We investigate the e¤ects of major parameters on the manufacturers and re-
tailers prots. Figure 5 shows that as a result of an increase in consumers
sensitivity to the restocking fee, two rms can both benet more from a partial
refund policy than from the full refund policy. We increase the value of  from
0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045. This can be justied as follows: the full refund policy
usually encourages more consumers to return. As a response to the increasing
returns, the retailer may choose to raise her retail price, which then results in less
sales. Thereby, the full refund policy makes the retailer worse o¤. In order to
compensate the retailer for her responsibility on consumer returns, the manufac-
turer chooses to reduce his wholesale price, which decreases his marginal prot
and thus the total prot.
Figure 5: The impact of  on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions under the full refund policy and those under a partial refund policy.
Because of a similar reason, we can also justify the comparison between the
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two rmsprots when consumerssensitivity to the retail price (or to the WOM
level) increases, wherein both the manufacturer and the retailer can always benet
from the full refund policy; see Figures 6 and 7. We increase the value of  from
0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045.
Figure 6: The impact of b1 on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions under the full refund policy and those under a partial refund policy.
Figure 7: The impact of b2 on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions under the full refund policy and those under a partial refund policy.
As Figure 8 indicates, when the value of  changes, we nd that if the value of
 is very high, then the full refund policy makes the retailer worse o¤; otherwise,
she can prot more under the full refund policy.We increase the value of  from
0.05 to 0.5 in steps of 0.045. However, the manufacturer can always enjoy a
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higher prot under the full refund policy. This occurs because, for the case of
a very high mismatch likelihood, the consumer returns are also very high; in
order to o¤set the loss resulting from the increasing returns, the retailer would
signicantly reduce her retail price and thus obtain a smaller prot.
Figure 8: The impact of  on two rmsprots in terms of their equilibrium
decisions under the full refund policy and those under a partial refund policy.
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the manufacturer
determines his wholesale pricing and quality decisions and the retailer then de-
cides on her retail price and restocking fee under the WOM e¤ect. We construct
a price- and WOM-dependent total sales model, and describe this problem as a
leader-follower game where the manufacturer acts as the leaderand the retailer
as the follower.Solving the game, we obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium. We
conduct sensitivity analyses to investigate the impact of some major parameters
(including , b1, b2 and ) on the two rmsdecisions, demand, and their prots;
see Table 2. From Table 2, we learn that the retail price is the only decision vari-
able that is a¤ected by all the parameters. This may mean that the retail price
plays a signicant role in the management of sales and product returns under the
WOM e¤ect.
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 b1 b2 
f # #  #
p " # " #
w  # " 
q  # " 
D(p; r(q)) # #
8<: # if b2 < q0b1," if b2  q0b1. "
(1  (f))
D(p; r(q))
" #
8<: # if b2 < q0b1," if b2  q0b1.
8<: " if   ^ ,# if  > ^ .
M # #
8<: # if b2 < q0b1," if b2  q0b1. "
R # #
8<: # if b2 < q0b1," if b2  q0b1.
8<: " if   ^ ,# if  > ^ .
Table 2: The impact of major parameters on the two rmsdecisions, sales, and
prots.
In order to explore the WOM e¤ect, we also analyze the setting in which there
is no WOM e¤ect, and compare our results with those in the presence of the
WOM e¤ect. Our results indicate how the WOM inuences the rmsdecisions
and prots. In addition, to nd the impact of restocking fee, we investigate the
scenario in which all returns are fully refunded, and compare the results with
those under a partial refund policy. Below is a summary of relevant managerial
insights.
1. The wholesale and retail prices under no WOM e¤ect are smaller than those
when the WOM e¤ect exists, whereas the restocking fee remains unchanged
regardless of whether the WOM e¤ect exists or not. Moreover, when the
WOM inuences the consumer purchase, the retailer may not achieve more
total sales and realized sales, which depends on the ratio of the value of the
equilibrium quality control level to the initial quality level. Specically, if
this ratio is su¢ ciently high, then the WOM e¤ect reduces the total sales
and realized sales; otherwise, both of these two sales are enlarged.
2. The WOM e¤ect makes the manufacturer worse (better) o¤ if the con-
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sumerssensitivity to the restocking fee is su¢ ciently small (large), whereas
the retailer always benets under the WOM e¤ect. Moreover, when con-
sumers are less sensitive to the retail price, both rms can benet more
in the presence of WOM. When the consumerssensitivity to the WOM is
su¢ ciently small, the WOM e¤ect makes the two rmsprots lower than
those under no WOM e¤ect.
3. The manufacturer always prots in the presence of theWOM e¤ect, whereas
the retailer prots under the WOM e¤ect only when the mismatch proba-
bility is su¢ ciently small. Moreover, under the WOM e¤ect, the manufac-
turers prot is increasing in the mismatch probability, whereas the retailers
prot is concave in the mismatch probability.
4. If each consumer returns his or her mismatched product with a su¢ ciently
large chance, then the realized sales under the full refund policy are higher
than those under a partial refund policy. The retailer can benet from
the full refund policy when the mismatch chance is not high, whereas the
manufacturer can always benet from the full refund policy.
In future, we consider more realistic problems, and we may extend this paper
to an experimental study concerned with the WOM e¤ect and the return poli-
cies including refund policy, exchange policy, and refund-exchange policy viz.,
consumers can decide either to receive refunds or to exchange for other products.
Furthermore, a retailer has an option of charging or not charging a restocking
fee. When we combine the return policies and the restocking fee decision, there
will be some di¤erent return policies available to online retailers. Each of these
policies has advantages and disadvantages. For instance, charging a high restock-
ing fee can help o¤set the losses resulting from product returns. However, it
also discourages online purchases, which may lead to more losses. However, if a
retailer charges a very low or no restocking fee, then unexpected consumer behav-
iors such as wardrobing will be likely to appear, making the retailer to possibly
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loss. The exchange policy also has some disadvantages. For example, under such
a policy consumers may perceive that the stock could comprise the used items,
which means that the exchanged products may be di¢ cult to sell. Therefore, we
cannot immediately nd which policy is the best one. It behooves us to compare
all the possible policies and nd the optimal return policy that can generate the
maximum prot for the retailer.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the value of p, we nd the optimal restocking
fee maximizing R(p; f) = [(p w)(1 (f))+(f+s w)(f)]D(p; r(q)). The
rst- and second-order derivatives of R(p; f) w.r.t. f are computed as
@R(p; f)
@f
= (f)[(p  w) + 1  (f + s  w)]D(p; r(q))
@2R(p; f)
@f 2
=  (f)D(p; r(q)) < 0,
which implies that R(p; f) is a concave function of f , and the optimal restocking
fee can be computed as
f (p; w) = p  s+ 1

. (10)
Using f (p; w) to replace f in R(p; f), we have
R(p; f
(p; w)) =

p  w + 1

(f (p; w))

D(p; r(q)). (11)
We compute the rst- and second-order derivatives of R(p; f (p; w)) w.r.t. p
as
@R(p; f
(p; w))
@p
=

1 

1 +
b1


(f (p; w))  b1(p  w)

D(p; r(q)),
and
@2R(p; f
(p; w))
@p2
=



1 +
b1


(f (p; w))  b1

D(p; r(q))
 b1

1 

1 +
b1


(f (p; w))  b1(p  w)

D(p; r(q)).
Using (10), we nd that at the point satisfying the rst-order condition,
@2R(p; f
(p; w))
@p2
=  (b1f (p; w)  1)D(p; r(q)),
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which is negative, because f (p; w) = p  w + 1=  1= > 1=b1. Then, the best
response price p can be uniquely obtained by solving the following equation for
p:
p = w +
1
b1
 

1
b1
+
1


(f (p; w)).
Recalling from (10) that f (p; w) = p w+ 1=, we have p as in (2). Therefore,
the optimal restocking fee is obtained as f  in (10). This proposition is proved.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the value of q, we partially di¤erentiate
M(w; q) in (3) once w.r.t. w as
@M(w; q)
@w
= D(p; r(q)) + (w   c  q)@D(p
; r(q))
@w
.
Since D(p; r(q)) = a exp( b1p + b2r(q)), we compute the rst-order derivative
of D(p; r(q)) w.r.t. w is
@D(p; f ; r(q))
@w
=  b1@p

@w
D(p; r(q)) =  b1D(p; r(q)).
It follows that
@M(w; q)
@w
= D(p; f ; r(q))  b1(w   c  q)D(p; r(q))
= [1  b1(w   c  q)]D(p; r(q)).
The second-order derivative of M(w; q) in (3) w.r.t. w is then computed as
@2M(w; q)
@w2
=  b1[2  b1(w   c  q)]D(p; f ; r(q)),
which is negative at the point w such that @M(w; q)=@w = 0. Given q, the
optimal wholesale price w(q) is found as w(q) = 1=b1 + c+ q. As a result,
M(w
(q); q) =
1
b1
D(p(w; q); r(q)), (12)
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where
p(w(q); q) = c+ q +
2
b1
+
1

W ( z exp ( z)) .
We then compute the rst-order derivative of M(w(q); q) w.r.t. q as
@M(w
(q); q)
@q
=
1
b1
D(p(w; q); r(q))

 b1@p
(w(q); q)
@q
+ b2
@r(q)
@q

=
1
b1
D(p(w; q); r(q))

 b1 + b2@r(q)
@q

,
and calculate the second-order derivative of M(w(q); q) w.r.t. q as
@2M(w
(q); q)
@q2
=
1
b1
D(p(w; q); r(q))

 b1 + b2@r(q)
@q
2
+
b2
b1
D(p(w; q); f (q); r(q))
@2r(q)
@q2
,
which is negative at the point satisfying the rst-order condition @M(w(q); q)=@q =
0. Thus, q can be attained by solving the following equation for q: r0(q) = b1=b2.
Since r(q) = ln(q=k0), q = b2=b1. This proposition is thus proved.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using (5), we nd the equilibrium retail price as
p = c+
2 + b2
b1
+
1

W ( z exp ( z)) .
The rst-order derivative of p w.r.t.  is computed as
@p
@
=   W ( z exp ( z))
z[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]

b21
=   W ( z exp ( z))
(b1 + b21)[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]
> 0.
Next, we examine the impact of  on the equilibrium restocking fee, f  =
z   s+ 1

W ( z exp ( z)), where z = 1 + =b1 > 1. Note that W (x) < 0 if
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x is a real number. Di¤erentiating f  once w.r.t.  yields
@f 
@
=   1
2
[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]  W ( z exp ( z))
z[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]

b21
=
 [1 +W ( z exp ( z))]2(b1 + 2)  2W ( z exp ( z))
2(b1 + b21)[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]
<
 [1 +W ( z exp ( z))]2( + b1)b1
2(b1 + b21)[1 +W ( z exp ( z))]
< 0.
We thus complete the proof of this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 2. Using (5), we nd that f  = z+W ( z exp ( z)) =,
where z = 1 + =b1 > 1. Di¤erentiating f  once w.r.t. b1 yields
@f 
@b1
=
W ( z exp ( z))  zb1(1 +W ( z exp ( z)))
zb21(1 +W ( z exp ( z)))
< 0.
We also learn that p = c + f  + 1=b1 + b2=b1 + h(f )   1=. The rst-order
derivative of p w.r.t. b1 is given as
@p
@b1
=   1
b21

(2 + b2)  W ( z exp ( z))
1 +W ( z exp ( z))

1 +
1
z

< 0.
We nd from (4) that @w=@b1 =  (1 + kb2)=b21 < 0 and @q=@b1 =  kb2=b21 < 0.
We thus prove the corollary.
Proof of Proposition 3. Given the wholesale price w, the retailers best re-
sponse price is p = w+1=b1+W ( z exp ( z)) =. Replacing p in M(w) with
p(w) and di¤erentiating the resulting function once and twice w.r.t. w, we have
@M(w)=@w = [1 b1(w c)]D(p) and @2M(w)=@w2 =  b1[2 b1(w c)]D(p),
which is negative at the point satisfying the rst-order condition. Therefore, the
wholesale price in Stackelberg equilibrium is w = c+1=b1. We can then compute
p, as given in this proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1. Comparing w in (4) and p in (5) with w and p in
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(6), respectively, we nd that w < w and p < p. In addition, f  = f  =
z +W ( z exp ( z)) =.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since f  = f , we only need to compare D(p) =
a exp( b1p) and D(p; r(q)) = a exp( b1p + b2r(q)). Although p < p, as
shown in Theorem 1. Using (5) and (6), we have
p = p +
b2
b1
,
and we compute
D(p) D(p; r(q)) = a exp( b1p)  a exp

 b1

p +
b2
b1

+ b2r(q
)

= a exp( b1p)  a exp( b1p   b2 + b2r(q))
= a exp( b1p)(1  exp( b2 + b2r(q))).
Therefore, if 1  exp( b2 + b2r(q))  0, or, the condition in (7) is satised, then
D(p)  D(p; r(q)). Otherwise, D(p)  D(p; r(q)). This theorem is thus
proved.
Proof of Proposition 4. We can prove this proposition, using similar argu-
ments as for Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. The expected sales under a partial refund policy and
those under the full refund policy are given as follows
D1 = (1  )D(p; r(q)) and D1 = (1  (f ))D(p; r(q)).
The di¤erence between D1 and D1 is computed as
D1  D1 = (1  )D(p; r(q))  (1  (f ))D(p; r(q))
= a exp(
b22
b1
  (2 + b2))[(1  ) exp( b1(c  s)
1    
b22
b1
)  (1  (f ))
 exp( b1(c+W ( z exp ( z)))

)].
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We nd that if and only if the following condition is satised,
(f )  1


1  (1  ) exp

b1(s  c)
1    
b22
b1
+
b1

W ( z exp ( z))

,
then D1 > D1, viz., the consumerssensitivity to the restocking fee can reduce
the realized sales. Otherwise, the realized sales rise. This theorem is thus proved.
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